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This paper studies the relationship between changes in the US macroeconomic
conditions and the excess return of 10 Asian stock markets (China, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand). My main
empirical findings are as follows. First, I find no evidence of a causal relationship (in
Granger’s sense) between macroeconomic conditions in the US and Asian stock
market excess returns. Second, in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, I find
that bull Asian stock markets reduce US economic policy uncertainty. Last, I show
that negative US credit and industrial production uncertainty shocks, and positive US
stock market volatility shocks have generated a short-run drop in Asian stock markets’
performances in the post-subprime crisis era.
Keywords: Asia stock markets; excess returns; economic policy uncertainty; rare
events
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1. Introduction
Asian stock markets have provided a relatively high risk-return performance for many
years. The equity risk premium (ERP) in Asian stock markets is significantly higher than
the ERP in the US stock market or other developed stock markets (Donadelli & Persha,
2014; Donadelli & Prosperi, 2012; Grootveld & Salomons, 2003, among others). This
‘performance gap’ is, on average, higher over the period 2002–2012 (i.e. post-Asian crisis
period), a period of increasing economic and financial integration.1 Therefore, the ERP in
Asian stock markets and the US ERP have followed different paths during the last two
decades (Donadelli, 2013; Donadelli & Persha, 2013; Grootveld & Salomons, 2003;
Jagannathan, McGrattan, & Scherbina, 2000). Existing empirical findings suggest that the
‘performance gap’ might be generated by the lack in the level of financial and economic
integration. In other words, international investors ask for an extra premium because
Asian stock markets are affected by local/regional shocks (Donadelli & Prosperi, 2012;
Harvey, 1995). However, the 2008–2009 global demand collapse has heavily affected
Asian stock markets’ performances (Donadelli, 2013).2 Given the current debate on
whether or not Asian stock markets are fully integrated, we ask the following question:
Do changes or uncertainty shocks in US fundamentals affect Asian stock markets’ per-
formances? Differently from existing studies that examine the impact of domestic macro-
shocks on domestic national stock market prices, I focus on the relationship between
changes in foreign (i.e. US) macroeconomic conditions and Asian stock market returns as
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well as on the impact of US uncertainty shocks (or rare events) on Asian stock market
prices.3 In addition, I examine the impact of Asian stock market shocks on the level of
economic policy uncertainty in the United States. The main objective of this study, there-
fore, is threefold: (1) testing whether there is a causal relationship between the US macro-
economic variables and the excess return of 10 Asian national stock markets (China,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and
Thailand); (2) investigating whether Asian stock market shocks affect the level of eco-
nomic policy uncertainty in the United States; and (3) investigating whether rare events
in the US credit, real and financial sectors have affected Asian stock market performances
in the post-subprime crisis (hereinafter post-crisis) period.4 The analysis is of general
interest and motivated by several factors. First, it may have implications for international
portfolio diversification strategies. In particular, it allows to understand whether or not a
portfolio composed by leading Asian stock market indexes is affected by changes in the
US fundamentals as well as by rare events (i.e. uncertainty shocks) either in the short run
or in the long run. This is key in the portfolio construction process. Second, it may have
policy implications. In particular, an analysis on the order of magnitude and duration of
the impact produced by a shock in the Asian stock market on the level of macroeconomic
policy uncertainty might affect policymakers’ actions.
The analysis developed in this paper extends previous empirical studies in three main
directions. First, it employs a novel set of key US economic indicators. In particular, I use
the growth rate of the following US macroeconomic variables: consumer credit outstand-
ing amount, industrial production and capacity utilization index, monetary base, institu-
tional money funds, personal saving rate, consumer sentiment index, civilian
unemployment rate and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index. The
ultimate goal of this set of variables is to capture major movements in the US liquidity,
production and stock markets. Some of the real economic measures (e.g. industrial pro-
duction, monetary base, civilian unemployment rate) employed in this paper have been
used by the existing literature to examine the relationship between macroeconomic varia-
bles and international stock market returns (Bilson, Brailsford, & Hooper, 2001; Dona-
delli & Prosperi, 2012; Ferson & Harvey, 1994). In contrast, the institutional money
funds, personal saving rate and consumer sentiment index are used for the first time in the
international finance literature. The level of economic policy uncertainty in the United
States is measured by using a newly introduced uncertainty index (Baker, Bloom, &
Davis, 2013). Third, in the spirit of Bloom (2009), it captures rare events (i.e. uncertainty
shocks) in the US production, credit and stock markets via a set of ‘ad hoc’ shock
indicators.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, I show that there are not statisti-
cally significant linkages between changes in the US macroeconomic conditions and
Asian stock market excess returns. I also find that there is no bidirectional causality
between Asian stock market returns and the level of economic policy uncertainty in the
United States. It turns out that US fundamentals do not explain the variation in Asian
stock market excess returns. This suggests that local factors might still play a crucial role.
Second, in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, I find that positive shocks in the
Asian stock market generate a long-lasting drop in the level of US economic policy uncer-
tainty. Last, I show that negative US credit and industrial production uncertainty shocks,
and positive US stock market volatility shocks produce a short-run drop in Asian stock
markets’ performances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature.
Section 3 describes data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 examines linkages
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between the US fundamentals and Asian stock market excess returns. Section 5 examines
linkages between Asian stock market excess returns and the level of economic uncertainty
in the United States. Section 6 studies the impact of US uncertainty shocks on Asian stock
markets’ performances. Section 7 concludes.
2. A brief review of the literature
The relationship between macroeconomic variables, both local and global, and stock mar-
ket performances as well as the effects of local and global macroeconomic shocks on
stock prices have been largely investigated. On one side, given the poor empirical record
of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and other standard asset pricing models, a
large number of empirical studies employ macroeconomic risk factors to capture the vari-
ation in international stock market returns (Bilson et al., 2001; Chen, Roll, & Ross, 1986;
Donadelli & Prosperi, 2012; Ferson & Harvey, 1994; Narayan & Narayan, 2012, among
many others). On the other side, following the increasing degree of co-movement
between real and financial aggregates and the ‘global impact’ of the last two international
recessions, recent studies focus on the impact of macroeconomic (or global) shocks on
stock markets’ performances. Rapach (2001), in a structural VAR (SVAR) framework,
examines the effects of macroeconomic shocks on real stock prices in the United States.
He finds that money supply, aggregate spending and aggregate supply shocks strongly
affect stock prices. In a bivariate SVAR framework, Binswanger (2004) find that indus-
trial production shocks are able to explain a small fraction of the variability in real stock
prices. He focuses on the US, European and Japanese stock markets. Similarly, Araujo
(2009) studies the role of macroeconomic shocks in explaining movements in real stock
returns in Latin America. The author observes that the dynamics of real stock returns is
largely affected by macroeconomic shocks. Daly and Fayyad (2011) empirically examine
the relationship between oil price and stock market returns for five Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries and two advanced economies (i.e. United Kingdom and United
States). Their results suggest that the percent of variance of the stock returns explained by
the oil price increases as oil prices increase. In addition, the predictive power of the price
of oil for stock returns increased during the 2007–2009 crisis. Sharma and Wongbangpo
(2002) study the relationship between changes in macroeconomic variables (i.e. gross
national product [GNP], the consumer price index, the money supply, the interest rate
and the exchange rate) and the stock price of five Asian markets (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). They find evidence of a long- and short-term rela-
tionship between stock prices and domestic macroeconomic variables, and conclude that
macroeconomic variables in these countries cause and are caused by stock prices (in
Granger’s sense).
While many studies have examined the impact of domestic changes in macroeco-
nomic fundamentals on domestic stock markets, or focus on the effect of US macroeco-
nomic shocks on European stock and bond markets (and vice verse), few studies in the
international finance literature have examined the impact of changes in macroeconomic
conditions across advanced economies on emerging/developing national stock markets.
An exception is Narayan and Narayan (2012), who examine the impact of the US
exchange rate and short-term interest rate on seven Asian stock markets over the pre-cri-
sis (i.e. January 2001–August 2007) and post-crisis (i.e. September 2007–January 2010)
periods. They find that changes in the US interest rate do not affect Asian stock markets
over the crisis period. In contrast, the US exchange rate statistically affects (negatively)
Asian stock returns.
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In contrast to previous empirical studies, this paper focuses only on the impact of
changes in foreign (i.e. US) macroeconomic conditions on domestic (i.e. Asian) stock
market prices. I employ a novel set of variables to capture changes in macroeconomic
conditions in the United States, the level of economic policy uncertainty in the United
States and the sequence of rare events seen in the United States during the 2007–2009 cri-
sis. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study aimed at examining the impact of
rare events in the US real and financial activity on Asian stock markets’ performances. In
addition, it is the first study that examines the relationship between the level of economic
policy uncertainty in the United States and the performance of the 10 leading Asian stock
markets.
3. Data description
3.1. Asian stock markets data
I compute monthly national stock market returns from Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional (MSCI) Total Return Indices (TRI) for the following Asian economies: China,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thai-
land. The choice of this set of Asian stock markets is motivated by several factors. First,
according to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) country classification, these
10 Asian countries are classified as emerging markets. This implies that they meet one of
the following two criteria: (1) the country is located in a low- or medium-income level
region; and (2) the country’s investable market capitalization-to-GDP ratio is relatively
low. Moreover, based on the IFC classification, these 10 Asian countries retain invest-
ment restrictions, a necessary condition to be classified as emerging markets. Emerging
countries, as classified by IFC, are listed in Table 1.
Second, all these markets have been liberalized in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Third, the position of the US investors in these equity markets has largely increased in
the early 1990s. In other words, there is evidence of structural breaks in the dynamics of
the US position in the Asian stock markets over the period 1990–1995. Last, the correla-
tion between the US stock market returns and the return of these 10 Asian stock markets
has largely increased in the early 1990s.5 In addition, these Asian stock markets have
received an enormous amount of attention both in the international finance literature and
in the financial industry over the last two decades (i.e. after equity market liberalizations).
It is worth noting that the annual average growth rate of stocks traded (measured as % of
Table 1. IFC country classification: emerging markets.
Africa Asia Eastern Europe Europe Middle East Latin America
Morocco China Czech Republic Greece Egypt Argentina
Nigeria India Hungary Portugal Israel Brazil
South Africa Indonesia Poland Jordan Chile
Zimbabwe Korea Russia Saudi Arabia Colombia
Malaysia Slovakia Turkey Mexico
Pakistan Peru
Philippines Venezuela
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Source: IFC (1999).
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GDP) across the 10 Asian economies is three times larger than the US stocks traded aver-
age growth over the period 1992–2012 (i.e. 32% vs. 11%). This is clear from Figure 1,
which plots the annual cumulative rate of change of the total value of shares traded across
the 10 Asian economies (dashed line) and in the United States (solid line).
Asian total monthly returns are measured for the period January 1988 (or later)–
December 2011 as the capital change component of an Asian country index plus the divi-
dend yields.6 In other words, dividends are reinvested. As standard in the literature, all
returns are measured in US dollars (Bilson et al., 2001; Chambet & Gibson, 2008; de
Jong & de Roon, 2005; Donadelli, 2013; Donadelli & Persha, 2013; Donadelli &
Prosperi, 2012; Grootveld & Salomons, 2003; Lee, Chen, & Chang, 2013; Pukthuanthong
& Roll, 2009). Note that returns denominated in US dollars retain only US inflation, are
consistent with US macroeconomic variables’ currency, and are homogeneous across
Asian economies. Given that returns are measured in US dollars, excess returns are in
excess of the one-month Treasury bill (T-bill) rate. Formally,
Zi;t ¼ MSCI TRIi;t
MSCI TRIi;t1
 1
 
 Rft ; ð1Þ
where Zi;t is the excess return of country i at time t,MSCI TRIi;t is the MSCI TRI of coun-
try i at time t and R
f
t is the one-month T-bill rate from Ibbotson Associates.
7 Monthly
summary statistics for the 10 Asian stock market excess returns are presented in Table 2.
Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis values, and the
Sharpe ratio. Panel B reports the correlation between the US stock market excess return
and the excess return of the 10 Asian stock markets.
Figure 1. Stocks traded (% of GDP).
Notes: This figure reports the cumulative growth rate of the stocks traded (measured as % of GDP)
across Asian stock markets (dashed line) and in the United States (solid line). The Asian annual
average growth rate of stocks traded is the equally weighted average of the 10 Asian markets.
Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during the period. Sample: 1993–2012.
Source: World Development Indicators.
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3.2. US macroeconomic data
To capture macroeconomic conditions in the United States, I employ seven macroeco-
nomic variables and a stock market volatility index. The ultimate goal of this set of var-
iables is to describe liquidity, production, and labor market conditions in the US
economy. This set includes the following series: consumer credit outstanding amount
(CREDIT), industrial production and capacity utilization index (INDPRO), St. Louis
adjusted monetary base (AMBSL), institutional money funds (IMFSL), personal saving
rate (PSAVERT), consumer sentiment index (UMCSENT) and civilian unemployment
rate (UNRATE). All macro-series are seasonally adjusted and provided by the St. Louis
Fed economic database. The US stock market volatility is represented by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index (VIX). The VIX is based on S&P 500
Index Options and provided by Datastream. All employed series are monthly growth
rates and run from January 1988 to December 2011. In addition, I employ the world
excess return (WORLD) which is the arithmetic return on the MSCI world equity index
(total return index) less the Ibbotson Associates one-month T-bill rate. To explain varia-
tion in international stock market excess returns, Ferson and Harvey (1994) and Bilson
et al. (2001) employ a similar set of macroeconomic variables. The former employ the
world excess return and seven global risk factors (change in Eurodollar Treasury bill,
log change in G10 foreign exchange rate, unexpected G7 inflation, change in long-term
G7 expected inflation, change in price of oil, change in G7 industrial production, G7
real interest rate). The latter employ the world excess return and four domestic macro-
economic variables (change in monetary base, change in goods price index, change in
industrial production, change in exchange rates). To examine the relationship between
the US macroeconomic fundamentals and the return of seven Asian stock markets, Nar-
ayan and Narayan (2012) use two US macroeconomic variables: (1) short-term interest
rate and (2) real exchange rate.8 The US risk factors employed in this paper are chosen
according to existing empirical studies on stock returns predictability and belong to a
set of popular downloaded series. The world excess return is from Ferson and Harvey
(1994). The changes in monetary base and industrial production are from Bilson et al.
(2001). The change in the level of volatility in the US stock market is from Donadelli
and Prosperi (2012). The other US macroeconomic components are chosen among the
first 30 popular series listed in the ‘FRED ECONOMIC DATA more popular series
list’.9 I notice that this set of variables is also in line with applied works recently devel-
oped by the financial industry (e.g. hedge fund).10 Summary statistics for the US macro-
economic variables are reported in Table 3.
4. On the role of the US macroeconomic indicators
4.1. Causality
To test causality between series, I employ Granger’s (1969) causality test. The idea of
Granger’s causality is as follows: if a variable Ct (e.g. US fundamentals) Granger-causes
another variable Ft (e.g. Asian national stock market excess return), then Ft can be pre-
dicted better by using the past values ofCt than by using those of Ft. Formally,
if PrðFtþnjFtkÞ ¼ PrðFtþnjFtk ;CtkÞ ) Ct 6¼ > Ft; ð2Þ
where PrðÞ denotes conditional probability, and 6¼> means ‘does not Granger-cause’.
The following bivariate autoregression is employed to test the causal relation between the
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US fundamentals (i.e. Ct) and the excess return of an Asian national stock market (i.e.
Ft):
Ft ¼ cF þ
XK
k¼1
CkFtk þ
XK
k¼1
dkCtk þ uF;t; ð3Þ
Ct ¼ cC þ
XK
k¼1
akCtk þ
XK
k¼1
bkFtk þ uC;t; ð4Þ
where cF and cC are constants, ak , bk , fk and dk are parameters, and uC;t and uF;t are
uncorrelated errors with zero means and finite variances. The null hypothesis that ‘Ct
does not Granger-cause Ft’ is rejected if the dk coefficients in Equation (3) are jointly sig-
nificantly different from zero. Similarly, ‘Ft Granger-cause Ct’, if the bk coefficients are
jointly different from zero in Equation (4). If both the dk and bk coefficients are jointly
different from zero, then a bidirectional causality exists. To have non-spurious inference,
the Granger-causality test requires that all series are stationary. In my empirical scheme,
both financial and macroeconomic variables enter in percentage change form. This produ-
ces stationary variables.11 Table 4 reports the pairwise Granger-causality tests between
the US macroeconomic variables and the 10 Asian stock market excess returns. I find no
evidence for a causal relationship between changes in the US fundamentals and Asian
stock market excess returns. Not surprisingly, I find that the excess return of the world
equity index Granger-cause 8 out of the 10 Asian stock market excess returns. In contrast,
I observe that 7 out of the 10 Asian stock markets Granger-cause the US monetary base
growth rate (i.e. India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand)
and the institutional money funds growth rate (i.e. India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand). In addition, the US stock market volatility seems to
be caused (in Granger’s sense) by the following Asian stock markets: India, Korea,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Overall, entries in Table 4
suggest that changes in US macroeconomic conditions cannot be used to explain variation
in Asian stock market excess returns.
4.2. Predictability
I briefly investigate the extent to which US macroeconomic variables are able to explain
the variation in monthly Asian stock market excess returns. In particular, I examine
whether a set of US economic condition indicators have explanatory power over Asian
stock market excess returns in a multiple beta model context. It is largely accepted that
macroeconomic variables tend to affect stock market prices with some delay (i.e. the
transmission of information contained in macroeconomic variables into stock market pri-
ces might be delayed). Therefore, the model does not assume a contemporaneous associa-
tion where all variables are measured at time t, that is, US macroeconomic variables are
lagged.12 Hence, the linear multi-factor model can be written as
Zi;t ¼ ai þ bi;WORLDWORLDt þ bi;CREDCREDt1 þ bi;INDPROINDPROt1
þbi;AMBSLAMBSLt1 þ bi;IMFSLIMFSLt1 þ bi;UMCSENTUMCSENTt1
þbi;PSAVERTPSAVERTt1 þ bi;UNRATEUNRATEt1 þ VIXt þ ui;t;
ð5Þ
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where Zi;t is the realized excess return for the ith Asian country at time t, WORLDt is the
realized return on the world equity portfolio at time t, CREDITt1 is the US consumer
credit growth rate at time t  1, INDPROt1 is the rate of change of the US industrial pro-
duction index at time t  1, AMBSLt1 is the rate of change of the St. Louis Adjusted
Monetary Base at time t  1, MFSLt1 represents the rate of change of the Institutional
Money Funds at time t  1, UMCSENTt1 is the rate of change of the US consumer senti-
ment index at t  1, PSAVERTt1 is the percentage change in US personal saving rate at
time t  1, UNRATEt1 is the rate of change of the US civilian unemployment rate at
time t  1, VIXt is the rate of change of the US stock market volatility index at time t and
ui;t is the innovation term.
13 Equation (5) is estimated using Newey and West (1987,
1994) standard errors in an ordinary least squares (OLS) framework. Estimation results
are reported in Table 5. The last two columns of the table show the R2 for the multi-factor
model and for the one-factor model (or world CAPM). Therefore, in the last column only
a constant and the excess return of the world equity portfolio are included. I observe that
the increment to the R2 from including the US macroeconomic fundamentals is small.
Estimation results confirm that the excess return of the world market portfolio explains
the largest part of variation in monthly Asian stock market excess returns. I find that the
unconditional betas of the world equity portfolio are statistically different from zero (and
positive) in 7 out of the 10 Asian stock markets. Not surprisingly, the unconditional betas
of VIX are statistically significant (and negative) in 5 out of the 10 Asian stock markets.14
In general, the estimation results indicate that Asian stock market excess returns show lit-
tle sensitivity to US fundamentals’ growth rates (consistently with the pairwise Granger-
causality test results reported in Table 4).15 Overall, I find that changes in the US macro-
economic conditions weakly explain the variation in Asia stock market excess returns.16
5. On the role of economic policy uncertainty
5.1. US economic policy uncertainty: a review
The empirical strategy of this section is based on a US-based uncertainty measure that has
been proposed in the recent literature on uncertainty shocks (Bloom, 2009). Specifically, I
use the economic policy uncertainty index constructed by Baker et al. (2013). The index
is built on the following components: (1) newspaper coverage of policy-related economic
uncertainty (i.e. frequency of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty);
(2) scheduled tax code expirations; and (3) forecaster disagreement about government
purchases and inflation. The first component refers mainly to economic policy decisions.
Uncertainty on economic policy decisions is captured by the number of articles contain-
ing specific policy-related terms (e.g. uncertainty or uncertain, economic or economy,
congress, deficit, federal reserve or FED, legislation, regulation or white house). Articles
are from the following 10 large newspapers: Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Dallas
Morning News, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, New York Times, San Francisco
Chronicle, USA Today, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post. The second component
relies on the activity of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that is usually uncertain
about tax-cuts extensions. The third component relies on the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) which reports forecast values for
a range of variables at various horizons. Baker et al. (2013) focus only on forecast data
for inflation, purchases of goods and services by the federal government, and purchases
of goods and services by state and local governments, three variables that tend to be influ-
enced by monetary and fiscal policy decisions. Forecasts are made at the individual level.
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In this setup, the cross-sectional dispersion of individual forecasts in the SPF data reflects
uncertainty about future outcomes.17 The economic policy uncertainty index is available
from 1985. Consistent with the sample analyzed in this paper, I focus on the evolution of
the index over the period 1988–2011. The evolution of the US economic policy uncer-
tainty index is reported in Figure 2. I observe that the index has followed an increasing
trend over the period 2008–2012. The average level of policy uncertainty in the pre- and
post-crisis era is 94.80 and 136.94, respectively. Figure 2 also suggests that the uncer-
tainty index in the pre-crisis period is less volatile than in the post-crisis period. The vola-
tility in the pre- and post-crisis periods is equal to 22.52% and 40.53%, respectively. It
turns out that the subprime crisis as well as the European sovereign debt crisis have
heavily affected the level of policy uncertainty in the United States. To conclude, I stress
that in the empirical analysis developed in the rest of the paper, the uncertainty index
enters in a log form. The ADF test with just a constant indicates that log-uncertainty is
stationary (see Table A1 in Appendix 1). From Section 4 I know that the growth rate of
the Asian stock market excess returns is stationary. This implies that I can use Granger’s
causality test to test bidirectional causality between the uncertainty index and the excess
return of the Asian stock markets (see Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, & Filis, 2012).
5.2. US economic policy uncertainty vs. Asian stock markets
5.2.1. Causality
In line with the analysis conducted in Section 4, I ask whether or not there is a causal rela-
tionship between the level of economic policy uncertainty in the United States and Asian
Figure 2. US macroeconomic policy uncertainty.
Notes: This figure reports the dynamics of the US monthly economic policy uncertainty index (solid
black line). The smoothed red dotted line – computed using the Hodrick–Prescott filter (smoothing
parameter λ ¼ 14; 400) – represents the trend of the US monthly economic policy uncertainty
index. The series is from Baker at al. (2013) and is publicly available at http://www.
policyuncertainty.com/. The sample goes from January 1988 to December 2011.
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stock markets’ performances. Results from the pairwise Granger-causality tests between
the excess return of the 10 Asian stock markets and the US economic policy uncertainty
index are reported in Table 6. Test values suggest that the level of economic policy uncer-
tainty in the United States does not cause (in Granger’s sense) the excess return of the fol-
lowing Asian stock markets: China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan and
Taiwan. In contrast, I find that nine out of the 10 Asian stock markets Granger-cause the
level of economic policy uncertainty in the United States. A bidirectional causality is
found between US uncertainty and the excess return of the following three Asian stock
markets: Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Overall, entries in Table 6 suggest that US
uncertainty cannot be used to explain the variation in Asian stock market excess returns
(consistent with results in Table 5).
5.2.2. Predictability
Via a standard two-factor linear model, I examine whether the level of economic policy
uncertainty in the United States explains the variation in Asian national stock markets
excess returns. Formally,
Zi;t ¼ ai þ bi;WORLDWORLDt þ bi;ECUNECUNt1 þ ui;t; ð6Þ
where WORLDt is the usual world excess return and ECUNt1 is the log of the US eco-
nomic policy uncertainty index at time t  1. Estimation results are reported in Table 7.
Table 6. Pairwise Granger-causality tests between the 10 Asian stock market excess returns (AS)
and the US economic policy uncertainty.
Test values
Country Null hypothesis F-value P-value
China (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 8.666*** 0.000
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 0.834 0.436
India (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 6.802*** 0.001
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 0.119 0.888
Indonesia (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 1.974 0.141
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 1.819 0.164
Korea (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 7.740*** 0.001
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 1.685 0.187
Malaysia (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 5.413*** 0.005
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 2.056 0.130
Pakistan (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 7.369*** 0.001
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 0.299 0.742
Philippines (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 3.793** 0.024
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 3.240** 0.041
Sri Lanka (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 2.684* 0.071
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 4.229** 0.016
Taiwan (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 8.036*** 0.000
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 1.469 0.232
Thailand (AS) 6¼> (ECUN) 3.667** 0.027
(ECUN) 6¼> (AS) 3.556** 0.030
Notes: ECUN is the US economic policy uncertainty index. The sample goes from January 1988 (or later) to
December 2011. ***, **, * denote rejections of the null hypothesis at 1% , 5% and 10% significance levels,
respectively. The symbol ‘ 6¼> ’ means ‘does not Granger-cause’.
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Consistently with entries in Table 5, I find that the additional risk factor reflecting eco-
nomic uncertainty does not improve the model’s performance in explaining the variation
in excess returns across Asian stock markets. bi;ECUN is statistically different from zero
only in three Asian stock markets (Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand). However, the coef-
ficient is relatively small suggesting that an increase in uncertainty weakly increases the
excess return of these stock markets. The estimation results in Table 7 also confirm that
the world excess return explains the largest part of variation in Asian stock market excess
returns. In fact, R2two is slightly higher than R
2
one. The cross-country average gap (i.e. R
2
two
minus R2one) is equal to 0.012. In other words, the two-factor model explains (on average)
only an additional 1.2% of returns variation. Overall, estimation results in Table 5 and 7
suggest that changes in US macroeconomic conditions have only limited ability to explain
the variation in Asian stock market excess returns.18
6. US economic policy uncertainty and shocks
6.1. Methodology
I examine the impact of Asian stock market shocks on US macroeconomic policy uncer-
tainty, and the effects of US uncertainty shocks (in the post-crisis era) on Asian
stock market prices in a VAR context. The standard mathematical representation of
Table 7. Regressions of the Asian stock excess returns on the US economic economic policy
uncertainty index.
Source of risk
Country Intercept
WORLD
bi;WORLD
ECUN
bi;ECUN R
2
two R
2
one
China 0.100 0.278 0.022 0.018 0.015
[0.127] [0.204] [0.027]
India 0.034 0.376*** 0.009 0.040 0.040
[0.100] [0.139] [0.022]
Indonesia 0.202 0.745*** 0.046 0.063 0.055
[0.134] [0.231] [0.029]
Korea 0.209* 0.583*** 0.046* 0.073 0.060
[0.109] [0.211] [0.024]
Malaysia 0.144 0.554*** 0.032 0.115 0.103
[0.093] [0.123] [0.019]
Pakistan 0.057 0.038 0.014 0.002 0.000
[0.101] [0.182] [0.022]
Philippines 0.243** 0.596*** 0.053** 0.106 0.082
[0.100] [0.169] [0.021]
Sri Lanka 0.193027 0.452** 0.043 0.055 0.040
[0.123] [0.187] [0.027]
Taiwan 0.178** 0.398** 0.039** 0.042 0.031
[0.090] [0.179] [0.019]
Thailand 0.326*** 0.832*** 0.071*** 0.145 0.114
[0.110] [0.183] [0.024]
Notes: This table reports the results of the regression model presented in Equation (6). ECUN is the log of the US
economic policy uncertainty index. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are from Newey and West
(1987, 1994). The last column reports the R2 from the one-factor regression (i.e. only a constant and the excess
return of the world market index,WORLD, are included in the regressions): Zi;t ¼ ai þ bi;WORLDWORLDþ ui;t.
The sample goes from January 1998 (or later) to December 2011. ***, **, * denote rejections of the null hypoth-
esis at 1% , 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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a VARðp; kÞ system is as follows:
Yt ¼ A1Yt1 þ A2Yt2 þ    þ AkYtk þWt ð7Þ
or
y1t
y2t
  
  
ymt
  
  
y
p
t
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Yt
¼
A111    A11m    A11p
A121    A12m    A12p
           
           
A1m1    A1mm    A1mp
           
           
A1p1    A1pm    A1pp
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
A1
y1t1
y2t1
  
  
ymt1
  
  
y
p
t1
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Yt1
þ    þ
Ak11    Ak1m    Ak1p
Ak21    Ak2m    Ak2p
           
           
Akm1    Akmm    Akmp
           
           
Akp1    Akpm    Akpp
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Ak
y1tk
y2tk
  
  
ymtk
  
  
y
p
tk
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Ytk
þ
u1t
u2t
  
  
umt
  
  
u
p
t
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Wt
where p represents the number of variables to be analyzed in the system, k is the number
of lags to be included in the system, A1, A2, :::, Ak are the p p matrices of coefficients to
be estimated, and Wt is a p 1 vector of innovations distributed as a white noise with
mean zero and variance V (i.e. innovations are uncorrelated with their own lagged values
and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand-side variables). Given that only lagged endog-
enous variables appear on the right-hand side of Equation (7), simultaneity does not rep-
resent an issue, and OLS deliver consistent estimates.
In this study, I estimate a set of bivariate VARs. Suppose that the excess return of one
of the Asian stock markets (e.g. F) and the US macroeconomic uncertainty shock
(e.g. F) are jointly determined by a VAR and let a constant be the only exogenous vari-
able. The bivariate VAR can then be written as follows:
Ct
Ft
 
¼ cC
cF
 
þ a1 b1
f1 d1
 
Ct1
Ft1
 
þ a2 b2
f2 d2
 
Ct2
Ft2
 
þ uC;t
uF;t
 
ð8Þ
or
Ct ¼ cC þ a1Ct1 þ b1Ft1 þ a2Ct2 þ b2Ft2 þ uC;t;
Ft ¼ cF þC1Ct1 þ d1Ft1 þ f2Ct2 þ d2Ft2 þ uF;t;
where k ¼ 1; 2, cF, cF, ak , bk ,Ck and dk are parameters to be estimated, and uC;t and uF;t
are the stochastic error terms (or innovations). I stress that the ordering of the variables
matters for the impulse response function analysis in a Cholesky decomposition context.
I assume that shocked variables (i.e. Asia stock market excess returns, in Section 6.2, and
US uncertainty shocks, in Section 6.3) are ordered first in a Cholesky decomposition.
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6.2. Asian stock markets vs. US economic policy uncertainty
From Sections 4 and 5 we know that the Asian stock market excess returns, US macroeco-
nomic variables and US economic policy uncertainty are stationary. Therefore, I am able
to estimate a set of bivariate VARs – defined as in Equation (8) – including the Asian
stock market excess return and the US economic policy uncertainty index as well as a
constant.19 In my VAR scheme, lags are selected according to the Hannan–Quinn infor-
mation criterion. Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions of changes in US macro-
economic policy uncertainty (black line) to an Asian stock market shock. The shaded area
denotes the bootstrap confidence interval. I observe that shocks in the Asian stock market
excess returns significantly affect US economic policy uncertainty. In particular, these
shocks exert a negative impact such that an increase in one of the lagged Asian stock mar-
ket excess returns is associated with a decrease in the level of US economic policy uncer-
tainty. The drop is higher between two and four months after the shocks. The order of
magnitude of the drop ranges from a minimum of 2.5% (Thailand) to a maximum of
4.1% (China). In other words, the log of the US economic policy uncertainty index dis-
plays a rapid fall of around 4% within two/four months, with a relatively slow recovery
from three/four months after the shocks. The 90% confidence bands (shaded areas) are
plotted around the impulse response functions, highlighting that this drop and the subse-
quent recovery is statistically significant at the 10% level. An exception is Pakistan which
positively affects (i.e. it increases uncertainty) US uncertainty one month after the shock.
However, the impact is negative and statistically significant from three months after the
shocks. Overall, I find that a shock in the Asian stock market excess return produces a
long-lasting decrease in the level of economic policy uncertainty.
6.3. US uncertainty shocks vs. Asian stock market
To evaluate the impact of uncertainty shocks (or rare events) on Asian stock market prices
(i.e. excess returns), I estimate a range of bivariate VARs (as defined in Equation (8)) on
monthly data from January 2007 to December 2011 (i.e. post-crisis era). The full set of
variables employed in the VARs are stock market volatility positive shock indicator,
credit and industrial production negative shock indicators, and the 10 Asian stock market
excess returns. The variables in the estimation order in each bivariate VAR are (1) shock
indicator and (2) Asian stock market excess return. As in Bloom (2009), the shock indica-
tors take value 1 if a rare event occurs, and 0 otherwise. I stress that these indicators iden-
tify only extraordinary movements (i.e. rare events) in stock market volatility, consumer
credit and productivity. Therefore, small ongoing fluctuations are not captured.
6.3.1. Stock market volatility shock indicator
Stock market rare events are chosen as those with stock market volatility more than
1.65 standard deviations above the Hodrick–Prescott detrended mean of the VIX series.
(The raw undetrended series in percentage change form is plotted in Figure 7.) Formally,
volatility shock indicatorþ ¼ 1 if VIXt > VIXhp þ 1:65SdVIX
0 if VIXt < VIXhp þ 1:65SdVIX

ð9Þ
where VIXhp is the Hodrick–Prescott detrended mean of the VIX series. Differently
from previous crises, the 2007–2009 crisis has been characterized by an extremely
high level of uncertainty both in the financial and in the real sectors. A marked
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Figure 3. VAR estimations of the impact of a shock in the Asian stock market on the US economic
policy uncertainty.
Notes: This figure reports the VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse responses of changes in US
economic policy uncertainty to Asian stock market shocks. The shaded area and the black line rep-
resent 90% confidence bands and point estimates, respectively. The set of bivariate VARs are esti-
mated including a constant (as defined in Equation (8)). Lags have been selected according to the
Hanna–Quinn information criterion. Standard errors are from Newey and West (1987, 1994). Data
are monthly and run from January 1988 (or later) to December 2011.
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increase in uncertainty is usually produced by extraordinary events. Given the
presence of a relatively high number of rare events in the subprime crisis era, I find
that the VIX is 1.65 standard deviations above the Hodrick–Prescott detrended (λ = 14,400)
mean of the VIX series for eight consecutive months over the period January 2007–Decem-
ber 2012 (see Table 8).20 I argue that the subprime crisis era is unique in that it displays a rel-
evant consecutive number of shocks, both in the stock and in the real markets. This implies
that in the aftermath of the crisis, the level of economic policy uncertainty in the United
States is constantly higher than in the pre-crisis era (see Figure 2).
6.3.2. Credit market shock indicator
Negative shocks in the consume credit market are chosen as those with consumer credit
negative growth rate less than 1.65 standard deviations below the Hodrick–Prescott
detrended (λ = 14,400) mean of the consumer credit growth rate series. Formally,
credit shock indicator ¼ 1 if CREDITt < CREDIThp  1:65SdCREDIT
0 if CREDITt > CREDIThp  1:65SdCREDIT

ð10Þ
where CREDIThp is the Hodrick–Prescott detrended mean of the consumer credit growth
rate series.21 I find that the consumer credit growth rate is below the threshold defined in
Equation (10) in 21 months over the period January 2007–December 2011.
6.3.3. Production market shock indicator
Negative shocks in the production market are chosen as those with industrial production
negative growth rate less than 1.65 standard deviations below the Hodrick–Prescott
detrended (λ ¼ 14,400) mean of the industrial production growth rate series. Formally,
production shock indicator ¼ 1 if INDPROt < INDPROhp  1:65SdINDPRO
0 if INDPROt > INDPROhp  1:65SdINDPRO

ð11Þ
where INDPROhp is the Hodrick–Prescott detrended mean of the industrial production
growth rate series. I find that the industrial production growth rate is below the threshold
defined in Equation (11) in six months over the period January 2007–December 2011.
Table 8. Subprime crisis era: US uncertainty shock dates.
United States: uncertainty shocks
Consumer credit 2008: Aug, Sep, Nov, Dec
2009: Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec
2010: Jan, Feb, Apr, May, Jul
2011: Aug
Industrial production 2008: Jul, Aug, Oct, Nov, Dec, Feb
Stock market volatility 2008: Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec
2009: Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr
2011: Sep
Notes: Stock market volatility, consumer credit and industrial production shock indicators are computed as
defined in Equations (9)–(11). Uncertainty shocks in the US credit and production markets are based on the
period January 1960–December 2011. Uncertainty shocks in the stock markets are based on the period January
1988–December 2011.
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As noticed by Bloom (2009), uncertainty shocks tend to be generated by major eco-
nomic and political shocks (e.g. Cuban missile, oil price shock and 9/11 terrorist attacks).
As mentioned above, the subprime crisis era has been characterized by a relative large
number of rare events, such as the Northern Rock support (September 2007), large inter-
est rate cuts (January 2008), Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 and Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (October 2008), Obama election (November 2008), banking crisis (February 2009),
Greek bailout (May 2010), mid-term elections (October 2010) and EU Mediterranean
countries sovereign debt crisis (fall 2011). Dates of credit, production and stock market
rare events (i.e. uncertainty shocks) are reported in Table 8, and can be informally
observed by looking at Figure B1, which plots the US credit consumer, industrial produc-
tion and stock market volatility growth rates over the period January 1988–December
2011. Do jumps in credit, industrial production and volatility have any impact on Asian
stock market performances?
Figures (4)–(6) plot the impulse response functions of Asian stock market excess
returns (solid black lines) to a credit, industrial production and volatility rare events
shock, respectively. Main results are as follows. First, I find that uncertainty shocks affect
negatively, with few exceptions, Asian stock market performances in the very short run
(i.e. one month after the shock).22 Second, the negative impact of a shock in the US credit
and industrial production markets on Asian stock market performances seems to be larger
(i.e. around 4%) than the impact generated by a volatility shock (i.e. around 1%–2%). In
addition, the 90% confidence bands around the impulse response functions (shaded areas)
suggest that the one-month negative impact of a volatility shock on Asian stock market
excess returns is not statistically significant (see Figure 6). In contrast, the immediate
recovery, which is represented by the presence of a positive response in t þ 2 (i.e. two
months after the shock), is statistically significant in most Asian stock markets. Last, the
negative impact of an industrial production shock seems to last for more than one month.
The response is statistically significant in the following Asian stock markets: Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (see Figure 5). It is also worth noting that the
order of magnitude of a negative response generated by a shock in the production shock
indicator tends to be higher than that produced by uncertainty shocks in the credit and
stock markets.23 I stress that the presence of a limited number of uncertainty shocks in
the US credit, production and stock markets observed in the pre-crisis sample gives rise
to different results (i.e. different impulse responses). In particular, the order of magnitude
of the impulse response of the Asian stock market excess return to shocks in the US
credit, production or stock market volatility shock indicators tends to be extremely small
and statistically insignificant. Differently, a full sample analysis and a post-crisis sample
analysis produce similar impulse response functions (i.e. responses with similar orders of
magnitude and durations).24 This is due to the similar number of rare events included in
these two samples (full and post-crises). As suggested by Figure B1, bizarre movements
in the US credit, production and stock markets take place exclusively in the post-crisis
era. It turns out that the impact of uncertainty shocks on Asian stock markets’ performan-
ces is higher in the subprime crisis era.
7. Conclusion
Emerging stock markets have attracted interest from a large number of international
investors. In particular, Asian stock markets, thanks to their solid risk-return performance
over the post-Asian crises period, have represented an ‘insurance investment strategy’ for
practitioners as well as for agents. Nevertheless, a high degree of economic and financial
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Figure 4. VAR estimations of the impact of a negative shock in the US credit market on Asian
stock markets.
Notes: This figure reports the VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse responses of the 10 Asian
stock market excess returns to a credit ‘negative’ shock indicator (computed as in Equation (10)).
The shaded area and the black line represent 90% confidence bands (bootstrap confidence interval)
and point estimates, respectively. The set of bivariate VARs are estimated including a constant (as
defined in Equation (8)). Lags have been selected according to the Hanna–Quinn information crite-
rion. Standard errors are from Newey and West (1987, 1994). Data are monthly and run from
January 2007 to December 2011.
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Figure 5. VAR estimations of the impact of a negative shock in the US production market on
Asian stock markets.
Notes: This figure reports the VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse responses of the 10 Asian
stock market excess returns to a production ‘negative’ shock indicator (computed as in Equa-
tion (11)). The shaded area and the black line represent 90% confidence bands (bootstrap confidence
interval) and point estimates, respectively. The set of bivariate VARs are estimated including a con-
stant (as defined in Equation (8)). Lags have been selected according to the Hanna–Quinn informa-
tion criterion. Standard errors are from Newey and West (1987, 1994). Data are monthly and run
from January 2007 to December 2011.
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Figure 6. VAR estimations of the impact of a volatility shock in the US stock market on Asian
stock markets.
Notes: This figure reports the VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse responses of the 10 Asian
stock market excess returns to a volatility shock indicator (computed as in Equation (9)). The
shaded area and the black line represent 90% confidence bands (bootstrap confidence interval) and
point estimates, respectively. The set of bivariate VARs are estimated including a constant (as
defined in Equation (8)). Lags have been selected according to the Hanna–Quinn information crite-
rion. Standard errors are from Newey and West (1987, 1994). Data are monthly and run from
January 2007 to December 2011.
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integration has affected the level of independence of international stock markets. In other
words, emerging and frontier markets’ performances are also influenced by global shocks.
While many studies assess the importance of domestic macroeconomic conditions on
domestic stock market prices, very few works have been devoted to examine the relation-
ship between foreign macroeconomic conditions and domestic stock markets. Following
the increasing degree of co-movement between real and financial variables and financial
integration across international stock markets, and the global effects of the last crisis, I
examine the relationship between changes in US macroeconomic conditions and the
excess return of 10 Asian stock markets. Using data from January 1988 (or later) to
December 2011, and focusing on the post-subprime crisis era, I obtain three main results.
First, in a Granger-causality framework, I find no evidence of a causal relationship
between changes in US macroeconomic conditions and Asian stock market excess
returns, suggesting that US fundamentals are not able to explain variation in monthly
Asian national stock market excess returns. Second, in a bivariate VAR framework, I find
that Asian stock market shocks produce a long-lasting drop in the level of economic pol-
icy uncertainty in the United States. Third, I show that negative US credit and industrial
production uncertainty shocks, and positive US stock market volatility uncertainty
shocks, have negatively affected Asian stock markets’ performances during the 2007–
2010 crisis.
I conclude by arguing that the results reported in this paper might have both portfolio
and policy implications. On one hand, the weak explanatory power of the US macroeco-
nomic fundamentals suggests that Asian stock market prices are still influenced by local
factors. Results suggest that only rare events in the US economy affect Asian stock mar-
kets’ performances. However, the effect is not long-lasting. This gives rise to long-run
diversification benefits. On the other hand, a drop in the level of domestic economic pol-
icy uncertainty – generated by foreign stock market shocks – might affect the behavior of
monetary and fiscal authorities. In particular, a higher level of macroeconomic stability
might induce them to be more aggressive.
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Notes
1. Asian financial crisis dates: Indonesia (1997–2002), Malaysia (1997–2001), Philippines
(1983–1987, 1997–2002), Sri Lanka (1989–1993) and Thailand (1983–1987, 1997–2002).
2. For a detailed discussion on the dynamics of emerging stock market prices in the pre- and
post-subprime crisis eras, see Donadelli (2013).
3. Throughout the paper, I use the terms macroeconomic variables, macroeconomic fundamen-
tals or fundamentals interchangeable.
4. I refer to the period January 2007–December 2011. As of January 2007, Ownit Mortgage Sol-
utions Inc. files for Chapter 11 and American Freedom Mortgage, Inc. files for Chapter 7
protection.
5. See Henry (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003), for a detailed discussion on
equity market liberalizations in Asia. For a detailed discussion on the presence of structural
breaks in the dynamics of the US investment in the Asian stock markets, see Bekaert and
Harvey (2000).
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6. Data availability: (1) Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand MSCI
TRIs are available from December 1987; and (2) China, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka MSCI
TRIs are available from December 1992.
7. The one-month T-bill rate is publicly available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/.
8. Differently from Narayan and Narayan (2012), my ‘monthly frequency analysis’ does not
impose the use of a relatively low number of global risk factors.
9. The selected variables are consistent with the selection procedure embodied in Autometrics
(see Doornik, 2009). The procedure has been used to build a novel global leading indicator
for Kalis Capital. The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those
of Kalis Capital.
10. These works build a global economic indicator aimed at capturing global cyclical swings. In
other words, a global leading indicator should provide early signals on turning points in the
global cycle. For example, the global leading indicator of Goldman Sachs includes a business
confidence aggregate, a consumer confidence aggregate, and the US initial jobless claims as
well as other international trade measures.
11. The results from the augmented Dickey–Fuller test are available upon request.
12. The regression in Equation (5) is also estimated assuming different lag structures (e.g. all US
macroeconomic variables measured contemporaneously and at t  2). Similar results are
obtained and available upon request.
13. Bilson et al. (2001) and Donadelli (2013) estimate a multiple beta model with a similar lag
structure.
14. In a conditional two-factor model, Donadelli and Prosperi (2012) obtain similar results.
15. Under mild statistical assumptions, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) applies, and
estimated values are similar to those obtained via OLS estimations. GMM estimation results,
where a constant and the US macroeconomic indicators are used as instruments, are available
upon request.
16. Results are clearly sample-sensitive. For example, Donadelli (2013) observes that the predic-
tive power of the global risk factors is increasing over time. I stress that a dynamic analysis is
beyond the scope of the paper.
17. For a detailed discussion on the construction of the US economic policy uncertainty index, see
Baker et al. (2013).
18. Note that a multi-factor model where the US economic policy uncertainty is added as an extra
risk factor to Equation (5) produces similar results.
19. I stress that one may use a structural VAR even if the variables employed in the analysis are
non-stationary. As discussed in Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) and Hamilton (1994), the
estimated coefficients of the VAR with possibly non-stationary variables are consistent and
the asymptotic distribution of individual estimated parameters is standard (i.e. normal distri-
bution). In addition, the impulse response functions are consistent estimators of the true
impulse-response functions except in long run (Phillips, 1996).
20. Bloom (2009) finds 17 stock market volatility shocks over the period July 1963–June 2008
(i.e. only one shock is associated with the subprime crisis).
21. With variables expressed in percentage change form, the difference between the mean of the
detrended series and the mean of the raw series is small.
22. Uncertainty shocks are defined as shocks on the credit, production and stock market volatility
shock indicators.
23. This is in line with recent international business cycle studies showing that there is little rela-
tion between credit and financial linkages that economies have with the United States and the
decline in their GDP growth rate and asset prices during the 2008–2009 global demand col-
lapse (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, & Perri, 2013; Kamin & Pounder, 2010; Rose & Spiegel,
2010).
24. The full set of impulse response functions is available upon request.
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Appendix 1. US economic policy uncertainty
Table A1 Unit root test results for the log of the US economic policy uncer-
tainty index (USEcPolUn). The monthly US economic policy uncertainty index
is from Baker et al. (2013) and is publicly available at http://www.
policyuncertainty.com/.
Series
Level
ADFm
log(USEcPolUn) (3.589***)
Notes: The augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADFm) includes a constant. The 10%, 5% and
1% critical values are -2.572, -2.872 and -3.455, respectively. ***, **, * indicate the sig-
nificance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
132 M. Donadelli
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
an
n C
hr
ist
ian
 Se
nc
ke
nb
erg
] a
t 1
4:2
4 0
7 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
Appendix 2. United States: stylized facts
Figure B1. Movements in the US credit, production and stock markets.
Notes: This figure reports the growth rate of the US consumer credit (CRED), industrial production
and capacity utilization index (INDPRO), and stock market volatility (VIX). The shaded vertical
bars denote NBER-dated recessions. Data run from January 1988 to December 2011.
Source: Fed St. Louis and Datastream.
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